xkb: proof GetCountedString against request length attacks

GetCountedString did a check for the whole string to be within the
request buffer but not for the initial 2 bytes that contain the length
field. A swapped client could send a malformed request to trigger a
swaps() on those bytes, writing into random memory.

Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
This commit is contained in:
Peter Hutterer 2022-07-05 12:06:20 +10:00
parent 1bb7767f19
commit 11beef0b7f

View File

@ -5137,6 +5137,11 @@ _GetCountedString(char **wire_inout, ClientPtr client, char **str)
CARD16 len; CARD16 len;
wire = *wire_inout; wire = *wire_inout;
if (client->req_len <
bytes_to_int32(wire + 2 - (char *) client->requestBuffer))
return BadValue;
len = *(CARD16 *) wire; len = *(CARD16 *) wire;
if (client->swapped) { if (client->swapped) {
swaps(&len); swaps(&len);